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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 which became effec-
tive on July 2, 1965, was enacted to eliminate artificial barriers to
employment that historically have deprived minorities and women
of employment opportunities. Section 703 of the Act thus makes
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (Supp. V 1975)).
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origin an unlawful employment practice.2 In order to obtain relief
from a discriminatory employment practice, an aggrieved party
must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally engaged in the
unlawful practice.3 Because the broad language of sections 703(a),
703(c), and 706(g) fails to define the terms "discriminate" and
"intentionally," the effectiveness of title VII in eliminating artificial
employment barriers depends upon the interpretation of these
terms by the federal courts.' In its first major title VII case, Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.,5 the United States Supreme Court rejected the
argument that a redressable violation of title VII requires a demon-
stration that the defendant had a subjective intent to discriminate,,
thereby establishing the effect of an employment practice on the
employment opportunities of minorities and women as the impor-
tant inquiry.7 The Court held that a facially neutral employment
practice depriving minorities and women of employment opportuni-
ties at a rate higher than the rate at which it deprives other employ-
ees constitutes a redressable violation of title VII.
A seniority system, although neutral in its operation and in its
intent, can have the effect of depriving minorities and women of
employment opportunities at a rate higher than the rate at which
2. Section 703 of the Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership . . . [on the basis of an]
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1975).
3. Section 706(g) of the Act provides: "If the court finds that the respondent has inten-
tionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged
in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
4. For a thorough discussion of the first ten years of federal court interpretation of title
VII, see Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement
and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis L.J. 225 (1976).
5. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
6. Id. at 432.
7. The Court stated: "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. (emphasis in Court's opinion).
8. The Court stated: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430.
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it deprives other individuals.' A seniority system with such effect
would be unlawful according to Griggs. Section 703(h)0 of title VII,
however, immunizes "bona fide" seniority systems from illegality.
Because neither the language nor legislative history of title VII de-
fines the term "bona fide," its definition has depended upon federal
court interpretation. The District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc." suggested that section
703(h) did not protect a seniority system that perpetuated the ef-
fects of past discrimination. Other federal courts adopted Quarles'
theory of discrimination to invalidate facially neutral seniority sys-
tems. Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States2 and
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 13 undermine the theory of discrimi-
nation enunciated in Quarles and followed by courts in other cir-
cuits. The purpose of this Recent Development is to examine the
impact of these two decisions on the meaning of the term "bona
fide" and to reassess the relevant scope of inquiry for determining
the legality of a seniority system.
UJ. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Legislative History of Section 703(h)
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 as originally introduced in the
House of Representatives contained no reference to title VII's effect
on seniority systems. 4 Opponents of the bill both in the House
9. For the purposes of this Recent Development, a seniority system can be defined as a
set of rules by which scarce employment opportunities are allocated on a competitive basis
between employees. An example of a competitive seniority system is a departmental seniority
system, in which opportunities are allocated on the basis of time spent in a given department.
An individual who transfers to a new department forfeits for competitive purposes all of the
seniority accumulated in the old department and enters the new department with no senior-
ity. Benefits such as pension rights and vacations generally are not allocated on a competitive
basis, but on the basis of total time with the employer. See W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN
WHITE UNIONS 68-69 (1977); Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent
Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260, 1263 (1967).
10. Section 703(h) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority
or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. V 1975).
11. 297 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
12. 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977).
13. 97 S. Ct. 1885 (1977).
14. See Cooper & Sobol, Senority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1608
(1969).
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Judiciary Committee and on the House floor objected that title VII
would impair existing seniority rights, and supporters of title VII did
not controvert these assertions.15 Without debate the House de-
feated an amendment 8 proposed by title VII opponents that would
have assured the protection of existing seniority rights."
In the Senate title VII supporters brought the bill directly to the
Senate floor.'" Consequently, no Senate committee report exists
from which legislative intent can be ascertained." Title VII oppo-
nents in the Senate revived their House counterparts' fear that title
VII would impair existing seniority rights. During a debate on April
8, 1964, Senator Clark responded to this fear by introducing into the
record three documents0 to establish that title VII would not affect
15. Id.
16. The amendment provided:
The provisions of this title shall not be applicable to any employer whose hiring and
employment practices are pursuant to (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a
system which predicates its practices upon ability to produce, either in quantity or
quality; or (4) a determination based on any factor other than race, color, religion, or
national origin.
110 CONG. REc. 2727-28 (1964).
17. See Cooper & Sobol, supra.note 14, at 1608-09.
18. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 431, 443-44
(1966).
19. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 14, at 1609.
20. The first document, Senator Clark's responses to questions of Senator Dirksen,
provided:
Question. Normally, labor contracts call for "last hired, first fired." If the last hired
are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if his contract requires they be first fired
and the remaining employees are white?
Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last hired,
first fired" agreement, a Negro happens to be the "last hired," he can still be "first fired"
as long as it is done because of his status as "last hired" and not because of his race.
Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his employment list because of
discrimination what happens to seniority?
Answer. The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to change
existing seniority lists.
110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964).
The second document, a memorandum prepared by Senators Clark and Case, the bipar-
tisan captains of the bill in the Senate, provided:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective
and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the
past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect the
employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory
basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire
Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give
them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier. (However,
where waiting lists for employment or training are, prior to the effective date of the title,
maintained on a discriminatory basis, the use of such lists after the title takes effect may
be held an unlawful subterfuge to accomplish discrimination.)
Id. at 7213.
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existing seniority rights." A bipartisan group prepared a new bill
containing section 703(h), 2 which passed the House and Senate
with no further debate on the seniority issue.2s
Several commentators interpreting the legislative history of
section 703(h) have indicated that Congress intended to protect all
seniority rights that accrued before the effective date of title V1I.L4
One commentator has observed, however, that Congress could not
have intended to protect all seniority rights accruing before July 2,
1965, because section 703(h) exempts only bona fide seniority sys-
tems from the coverage of the Act.2s Another suggests that the con-
clusion one draws from the legislative history of section 703(h) will
depend upon whether one believes that the application of a neutral
seniority system can constitute discrimination. 26 Reliance upon the
legislative history of section 703(h) to determine a seniority system's
legality thus produces different results because the ambiguity of the
history invites different interpretations.
The third document, a Justice Department memorandum, provided:
First, it has been asserted that title VII would undermine vested rights of seniority.
This is not correct. Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time
it takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event
of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not be
affected in the least by title VII. This would be true even in the case where owing to
discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority
than Negroes. Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance
for promotion because under established seniority rules he is "low man on the totem
pole" he is not being discriminated against because of race. Of course, if the seniority
rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under title VII. If a rule were to state
that all Negroes must be laid off before any white man, such a rule could not serve as
the basis for a discharge subsequent to the effective date of the title. I do not know how
anyone could quarrel with such a result. But, in the ordinary case, assuming that senior-
ity rights were built up over a period of time during which Negroes were not hired, these
rights would not be set aside by the taking effect of title VII. Employers and labor
organizations would simply be under a duty not to discriminate against Negroes because
of their race. Any differences in treatment based on established seniority rights would
not be based on race and would not be forbidden by the title.
Id. at 7207.
21. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 14, at 1609.
22. The group presented the new bill to the Senate on May 26, 1964.
23. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 14, at 1610-11.
24. See, e.g., Rachlin, Title VI.: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. hNUS. & COM.
L. REv. 473, 478 (1966); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discrimination by Labor
Unions, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58, 78 (1966).
25. See GOULD, supra note 9, at 70.
26. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 14, at 1611.
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B. The Judicial Interpretation of Section 703(h) and
Congressional Approval of This Interpretation
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc. presented the first challenge to
a departmental seniority system under title VII.Y The defendant
company in Quarles was organized into four departments, each hav-
ing a job progression ladder and seniority roster. Because of past
discriminatory hiring practices, blacks were concentrated in two
departments generally less desirable than the predominantly white
departments. Although prior to 1961 blacks could not transfer to the
more desirable departments, in 1961 and 1963 the company and
union established systems enabling a limited number of blacks to
transfer to predominantly white departments. These limited trans-
fer agreements, however, did not eliminate the racial character of
the departments created by the company's discriminatory hiring
policy. The district court found that because the company had dis-
continued its discriminatory hiring practices before January 1,
1966,28 plaintiffs no longer were entitled to relief from those prac-
tices.29 Plaintiffs contended, however, that blacks hired before Janu-
ary 1, 1966, continued to be deprived of employment opportunities
because of their race."0 According to plaintiffs, blacks were deterred
from transferring to the more desirable departments because they
would have to forfeit their accumulated seniority. Plaintiffs ob-
served that blacks who did transfer continued to be disadvantaged
because once in the new department they were forced to compete
with whites on the basis of departmental seniority that they had
been unable to accumulate because of the company's past discrimi-
natory practices. 31 Plaintiffs further argued that a black employee
would never be able to attain all the employment opportunities
enjoyed by white employees hired at the same time who had not
been discriminatorily placed in the less desirable departments. 32
Plaintiffs therefore alleged that the seniority system violated section
703 because the system perpetuated the effects of past racial dis-
crimination. Defendant maintained that the seniority system
27. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (Circuit Judge Butzner sitting by designation).
For commentary on Quarles, see GouLw, supra note 9, at 74-75; Gould, Seniority and the
Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEx. L. REv. 1039 (1969);
Comment, 46 N.C.L. REv. 891 (1968).
28. 279 F. Supp. at 508.
29. No complaint alleging that the hiring policy was an unlawful employment practice
had been filed with the EEOC within the required time period.





awarded employment opportunities on a nondiscriminatory basis
and, relying on the legislative history of section 703(h),3 contended
that the present consequences of past discrimination fall outside the
coverage of title VIIY1
The district court35 quoted the legislative history relied upon by
defendant and observed that this material did not address the effect
of section 703(h) on departmental seniority systems. The court
noted that references to seniority in the legislative history suggested
that Congress included section 703(h) in title VII merely to ensure
that innocent employees would not be deprived of their accumu-
lated seniority.3' The court thus determined that the legislative his-
tory indicated that a discriminatory seniority system established
before the effective date of title VII would not be "bona fide" under
section 703(h). 31 The court relied on the language of section 703(h)
and the general purpose of title VII to support its interpretation of
the section's legislative history.38 The court stated that lack of dis-
crimination is one characteristic of a bona fide seniority system39
and then held that a bona fide seniority system cannot have its
"genesis" in discrimination."
According to the court the issue also could be resolved by the
proviso in section 703(h)."4 The court held that the present differ-
ences between the employment opportunities for blacks and whites
allocated by defendant's seniority system violated title VII because
they arose from an intention to discriminate against blacks in hiring
prior to January 1, 1966.42 The court ordered the company to allow
qualified black employees hired before January 1, 1966,13 to transfer
33. The defendants quoted the documents presented in note 20 supra. Id. at 516.
34. Id. at 515.
35. In the text of its opinion the district court stated that it had "freely drawn" from
the analysis in Note, supra note 9. Id. at 510.
36. Id. at 516.
37. Id. at 517. The legislative history does not support this conclusion, but neither does
it support the contrary conclusion. The Court concluded its observations of the legislative
history in the following language, which has been quoted in many cases since Quarles: "It is
also apparent that Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees
into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act." Id. at 516.
38. Id. at 517.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The proviso provides: "provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
42. 279 F. Supp. at 517-18.
43. With respect to blacks hired after January 1, 1966, the court commented: "The
departmental seniority status of Negroes hired after January 1, 1966 is predicated on a bona
fide seniority system that did not result from an intention to discriminate on the ground of
race." Id. at 520.
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to predominantly white departments and fill vacancies on the basis
of their employment seniority. Blacks who obtained positions in the
more desirable departments would be allowed to compete for em-
ployment opportunities on the basis of employment seniority.44
Quarles left open the question whether a seniority system is
illegal if it perpetuates the effects of an act of discrimination that
occurred prior to July 2, 1965.11 In Local 189, United Papermakers
and Paperworkers v. United States the Fifth Circuit addressed the
issue and held that a seniority system with such characteristic vio-
lates title VII.1 The defendant company in Local 189 had main-
tained segregated lines of job progression and had placed blacks in
the less desirable line. Although the lines were merged before the
effective date of title VII, blacks continued to be treated unfavora-
bly because they occupied the lower levels of the single progression
line. The company's abolishment of the discriminatory practice be-
fore the effective date of title VII was irrelevant to Judge Wisdom,
who agreed with Quarles' interpretation of the legislative history of
title VII 47 and its evaluation of the nature of a bona fide seniority
system.48 Judge Wisdom, in addition to accepting Quarles' defini-
tion of discrimination, enunciated the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of the term "intentionally" in section 706(g). The court held that
to satisfy the intent requirement a plaintiff must show only that the
defendant intended to adopt the employment practice, not that he
subjectively intended to discriminate.49 The court inferred the in-
tent necessary to satisfy section 706(g) from defendant's continua-
tion of the employment practice after its discriminatory propensity
had become apparent. 0
The Second Circuit, which adopted Quarles' theory of discrimi-
nation in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,5' sought to assure
44. Id. at 521.
45. See GOULD, supra note 9, at 75.
46. 416 F.2d 980 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
47. Id. at 987-88.
48. See id. at 994-95. Local 189 is not the only Fifth Circuit case that expresses approval
of Quarles. See, e.g., Resendis v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 505 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976); Herrera v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d 66 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d
418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
49. 416 F.2d at 996.
50. Id. at 997.
51. 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971). Although on appeal liability was not at issue, the court
stated that it approved the district court's application of the Quarles theory of discrimination.
The Second Circuit said that "[t]he pervasiveness and longevity of the overt discriminatory
hiring and job assignment practices. . . compel the conclusion that the present seniority and
transfer provisions were based on past discriminatory classifications." Id. at 659. Another
Second Circuit case approving Quarles is Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 31:151
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
that black employees would not be deterred from transferring to
formerly white departments. The court found that the company's
seniority and transfer systems in two ways deterred such transfers.
First, blacks hesitated to transfer to the predominantly white de-
partments because they would lose their accumulated seniority and
in many cases would suffer a wage reduction. 52 Second, blacks who
transferred to more desirable departments thereafter would be
forced to compete on the basis of departmental seniority that they
had been unable to accumulate. 3 To eliminate the deterrent effect
of the seniority system the court ordered the company to pay trans-
ferees a wage at least as great as the wage they received in their old
jobs and to allow transferees to compete for promotions in the new
departments on the basis of employment seniority rather than de-
partmental seniority.54
Congress indicated its approval of the Quarles line of cases
when it enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,15
which amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A Senate report from
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare5" and a House report
from the Committee on Education and Labor57 both found the con-
cept of discrimination much more complex than had been imagined
in 1964.18 Both reports cited Quarles and Local 189 with apparent
52. 446 F.2d at 658.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 666. The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits also have approved
Quarles' theory that a seniority system perpetuating the effects of past discrimination violates
title VII. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1977); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 2669 (1977); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d
354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1975).
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have suggested their approval of Quarles. See, e.g., Bowe v.
Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). Commentators also have
expressed their approval of this element of Quarles. See, e.g., GOULD, supra note 9; Blumro-
sen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RuTrGERs L. REv.
268 (1969); Cooper & Sobol, supra note 14; Fine, Plant Seniority and Minority Employees:
Title VII's Effect on Layoffs, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 73 (1975); Poplin, Fair Employment in a
Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 177 (1975); Ross, Reconciling
Plant Seniority with Affirmative Action and Anti-Discrimination, 28 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 231
(1976).
55. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp.
V 1975)).
56. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
57. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
58. The Senate committee remarked:
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and pervasive
phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem in
terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the litera-
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approval, and the Senate report noted the works of several commen-
tators approving Quarles."9 The House report commented that Local
189 had made a significant contribution toward the elimination of
employment discrimination. 0 The floor managers of the 1972
amendment placed into the Congressional Record an analysis of all
the sections of the bill prepared by the Conference Committee of the
House and Senate, 1 which stated that unless otherwise indicated
existing title VII case law would remain in effect.62 Nothing in the
1972 amendment indicated the invalidity of the judicial interpreta-
tion of section 703(h).
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 3 the first United
States Supreme Court decision interpreting section 703(h), the
Court held that the section does not bar the award of retroactive
seniority as a remedy under section 706.4 The Court stated that the
purpose of section 703(h) is to determine whether an unlawful em-
ployment practice exists when a seniority system is alleged to per-
petuate the effects of discrimination that occurred before the effec-
tive date of title VII. 5 Resolution of the issues in Franks did not
compel the Court to decide whether a seniority system with that
effect is unlawful. At that time, however, lower federal courts, Con-
ture on the subject is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics of seniority
and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory
practices through various institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements.
In short, the problem is one whose resolution in many instances requires not only expert
assistance, but also the technical perception that the problem exists in the first instance,
and that the system complained of is unlawful.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Seass. 5 (1971).
59. Id. at n.1; H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 n.2 (1971).
60. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Seass. 13 (1971).
61. 118 CoNG. REc. 7166, 7563 (1972).
62. The analysis provided: "In any area where the new law does not address itself, or
in any areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was assumed that the
present case law as developed by the courts would continue to govern the applicability and
construction of Title VII." Id. at 7564. More specifically, in discussing § 706(a) of the Act
the analysis stated that "[t]he unlawful employment practices encompassed by sections 703
and 704, which were enumerated in 1964 in the original Act, and as defined and expanded
by the courts remain in effect." Id.
63. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
64. Id. at 762.
65. The Court said:
[Wihatever the exact meaning and scope of § 703(h) in light of its unusual legislative
history and the absence of the usual legislative materials . . . it is apparent that the
thrust of the section is directed toward defining what is and what is not an illegal
discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority sys-
tem is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the
effective date of the Act.
Id. at 761.
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gress, and commentators agreed that a seniority system perpetuat-
ing the effects of past discrimination violated title VII.
III. Two RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND
LOWER COURT RESPONSES TO THESE DECISIONS
A. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans6 the Supreme Court faced
the issue whether a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of
a past discriminatory practice violates title VII. The plaintiff in
Evans was a female flight attendant forced to resign in 1968 because
the defendant company refused to allow female flight attendants to
continue employment after they married. In 1971 the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the company's marriage policy violated title VII.67
Defendant rehired plaintiff in 1972, but refused to credit her with
seniority acquired before her 1968 discharge. 8 Plaintiff contended
that the seniority system constituted a present, continuing violation
of title VII because it treated her less favorably than males hired
between her 1968 discharge and her 1972 reemployment, thereby
perpetuating the effects of the company's past discriminatory pol-
icy.8 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois dismissed plaintiff's complaint, ° but the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed. 7' The Supreme Court held that the dis-
trict court properly had dismissed plaintiff's complaint.72
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens conceded that some
males with less total service with the defendant company than the
plaintiff nevertheless had greater seniority. 73 Justice Stevens ob-
served, however, that females hired between 1968 and 1972 also had
66. 97 S. Ct. 1885 (1977).
67. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971). The plaintiff in Evans was not a party to the Sprogis litigation, nor was she
included in the group reinstated because of that decision. Plaintiff failed to file a timely
charge based on her discharge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Consequently, an action based on her discharge was time barred. 97 S. Ct. at 1887-
88.
68. Plaintiff was rehired on February 16, 1972, but did not file charges with the EEOC
until February 21, 1973. The Court held that plaintiff could not claim jurisdiction based on
the defendant's initial refusal to credit her with previously acquired seniority because she
failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC. 97 S. Ct. at 1888 n.9.
69. Id. at 1888.
70. 12 F.E.P. 287 (1975).
71. 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976). For commentary on the court of appeals resolution of
this case, see 53 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 520 (1976).




greater seniority than plaintiff. 4 In addition, he noted that all em-
ployees whose employment had been discontinued for discrimina-
tory or nondiscriminatory reasons and who later had been rehired
also had been denied previously acquired seniority.75 Justice Ste-
vens thus found that plaintiffs complaint failed to allege that the
seniority system treated similarly situated males and females differ-
ently.76 Although the Court agreed that the seniority system perpet-
uated the effects of a past discriminatory policy, it stated that be-
cause plaintiff failed to file a timely charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, the defendant was entitled to treat
the past policy as lawful." Emphasizing that the seniority system
was neutral in its operation,7 8 the Court held that the mere fact that
the seniority system perpetuates the effects of a past discriminatory
act does not establish a violation of title VII.1 In a footnote Justice
Stevens attempted to distinguish the Quarles line of cases by ob-
serving that plaintiff in Evans did not allege that a departmental
seniority system deterred the exercise of rights guaranteed by title
VII. 80
Justice Stevens continued by stating that section 703(h) sup-
plied alternative grounds for dismissing plaintiffs complaint." Al-
though recognizing that section 703(h) does not bar suits alleging a
discriminatory seniority system, 2 the Court held that no actionable
claim exists when a neutral seniority system merely perpetuates the
effects of a past act of discrimination that has no "present legal
significance. ' 83 The Court observed that a contrary view would
allow claims otherwise barred by limitation periods to be revived by
a claim for seniority credit, thus defeating the purpose of section
703(h) and provisions in title VII that limit the time within which




76. Id. at 1888-89.
77. The Court stated:
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equiva-
lent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed. It may consti-
tute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current
practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in




80. Id. at n.10.
81. Id. at 1890.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined, dissented. Marshall con-
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B. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States
The Court again examined section 703(h) in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,85 in which the govern-
ment brought suit against a company and a union," alleging that
the company's hiring, assignment, and promotion policies discrimi-
nated against blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons87 and that the
seniority system in the collective bargaining agreement between the
company and the union discriminated with respect to promotions
and transfers. 8 The government claimed that, although the senior-
ity system deterred all employees from transferring to line driver
jobs, blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons suffered more than oth-
ers because they discriminatorily had been denied the opportunity
to become line drivers when initially employed. 9 The government
also contended that a black or Spanish-surnamed individual having
to surrender his seniority in order to gain a line driver position would
never attain the employment opportunities he would have enjoyed
in the absence of discrimination," and that a seniority system per-
petuating the effects of either post-Act or pre-Act discrimination
could never be bona fide under section 703(h)." Defendants re-
sponded that the seniority system, when considered in light of its
history, intent, application, and the circumstances surrounding its
creation and maintenance, was bona fide within the meaning of
section 703(h),9 2 which immunizes seniority systems that merely
tended that the relevant consideration was that "[blut for her sex, [plaintiff] presently
would enjoy all the seniority rights that she seeks through this litigation." Id. at 1890. Mar-
shall also asserted that § 703(h) does not validate a seniority system that perpetuates the
effects of past discrimination. Id. at 1890.
85. 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977).
86. Section 707(a), which allows the government to bring title VII suits, provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group
of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature
and is intended to deny the full exercise of rights herein described, the Attorney General
may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (Supp. V 1975).
87. The most desirable jobs with the defendant company were line driver positions,
which constituted a separate bargaining unit within the company. The generally less desira-
ble, lower paying jobs were those in city operations and servicemen positions. The government
supplied statistics demonstrating that only 0.4% of the line drivers were black and 0.3% were
Spanish-surnamed persons. Most blacks (83%) and Spanish-surnamed persons (78%) who
worked for the company held jobs in city operations and servicemen positions.
88. 97 S. Ct. at 1851.
89. Id. at 1859. Other workers when initially hired either did not seek employment as
line drivers or were denied such employment for nondiscriminatory reasons.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1860.
92. Id. at 1859.
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perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. 3 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that the com-
pany had engaged in an unlawful pattern of discrimination and that
the union also had violated title VII by aiding the company in its
maintenance of a seniority system that deterred blacks and
Spanish-surnamed persons from exercising rights guaranteed by the
Act. 4 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court conclusions,
but held that the district court prescribed inadequate relief. 5
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether a
seniority system perpetuating the effects of past discrimination vio-
lates title VI111 Observing that the company had discriminated both
before and after the effective date of the Act, Justice Stewart fo-
cused first on post-Act discrimination and reasoned that Franks
entitled those discriminated against after the effective date of title
VII to retroactive seniority regardless of the legality of the seniority
system. The lower court's injunction against the union, however,
forced the Court to determine the legality of the seniority system.
The Court relied upon Evans to hold that a seniority system does
not violate title VII merely because it perpetuates the effects of post-
Act discrimination.
9 8
In determining whether the seniority system was illegal because
it perpetuated the effects of pre-Act discrimination, the Court rec-
ognized that the system would be illegal according to Griggs unless
immunized by section 703(h)." Justice Stewart conceded that the
seniority system distributed employment opportunities in a dispro-
portionate manner,00 but after considering the language of section
703(h) and its legislative history, °'0 he concluded that Congress nev-
ertheless had extended a degree of immunity to otherwise neutral
93. Id.
94. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 6 F.E.P. 690 (1972).
95. 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975).
96. Another issue with which the Court dealt was raised by defendant's allegation that
the United States had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because statis-
tics formed the bulk of the government's evidence. The Court held that the evidence was
adequate to establish a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination. 97 S. Ct.
at 1854-58.
97. Id. at 1860.
98. Id. at 1861 n.30.
99. Id. at 1862.
100. Id.
101. See notes 13-22 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the legislative
history surrounding the 1972 amendments, see notes 63-70 supra and accompanying text.
After commenting that the legislative history was subject to different interpretations, the
Court stated that the views of the 1972 Congress were unimportant in determining the intent
of the 1964 Congress. 97 S. Ct. at 1864 n.39.
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seniority systems.'0 The Court rejected the government's conten-
tion that a bona fide seniority system must not perpetuate the ef-
fects of pre-Act discrimination because this proposition would
"disembowel" section 703(h).13 The Court observed that section
703(h) protects only seniority systems that are bona fide and do not
intentionally discriminate on the basis of race."°4 Although the Court
cited Quarles, Local 189, and Bethlehem Steel as strong support for
the government's proposition, it stated that:
Insofar as the result in Quarles and in the cases that followed it depended upon
findings that the seniority systems were themselves "racially discriminatory"
or had their "genesis in racial discrimination," . . . the decisions can be
viewed as resting upon the proposition that a seniority system that perpetuates
the effects of pre-Act discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent to dis-
criminate entered into its very adoption.05
Justice Stewart commented that Congress had not intended to in-
validate the exercise of vested seniority rights at the expense of pre-
Act discriminatees.
0
Examining the challenged seniority system, the Court empha-
sized the government's concession that the seniority system had a
genesis free from discrimination and that it had no illegal purpose
in its creation or maintenance.' 7 The Court also observed that the
seniority system's deterrent effect did not discriminate against
blacks and Spanish-surnamed employees because it deterred
equally all employees within the system.' The Court found that the
separate bargaining unit for line drivers was rational, consistent
with industry practice, and consistent with NLRB decisions.0 9 The
Court thus concluded that the seniority system was bona fide and
protected by section 703(h)."10
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, challenged the
Court's conclusion that section 703(h) might immunize a seniority
102. Id. at 1863.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1860 n.28 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1864.
107. Id. at 1865.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Court continued in its opinion to resolve issues of individual relief to which
post-Act discriminatees were entitled. In resolving one issue the Court held that an individ-
ual's failure to apply for a line driver's position did not foreclose the possibility of his receiving
retroactive seniority. The Court recognized that the company's notorious discrimination may
have deterred individuals from making what they thought to be useless applications. The




system even though it perpetuates past discriminatory practices."'
Justice Marshall asserted that the legislative history of section
703(h)," 2 subsequent lower federal court"' and administrative inter-
pretations of the section,"' and subsequent legislative develop-
ments"5 controverted the Court's conclusion. Despite the Court's
conclusion, Justice Marshall suggested that the Quarles line of cases
could survive Teamsters because they could be distinguished on
their facts."'
C. Lower Federal Court Responses to Evans and Teamsters
Several lower federal courts have followed Justice Marshall's
suggestion and have attempted to distinguish Teamsters from cases
before them for review. ' In Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry
Co."I the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded a district court
decision, instructing the lower court to consider Franks and
Teamsters. The court informed the lower court that discrimination
in a company's hiring practices constitutes a relevant consideration
in determining the legality of a seniority system."' In James v.
Stockham Valve & Fitting Co. 120 Judge Wisdom instructed the dis-
trict court to consider the "totality of circumstances" in determin-
ing the legality of the challenged seniority system. According to
Judge Wisdom, a bona fide seniority system must satisfy four cri-
teria. First, to the extent the system has a deterrent effect, it must
deter equally all employees within the system. Second, seniority
units composing separate bargaining units must be rational and in
111. Id. at 1875.
112. Id. at 1882.
113. Id. at 1876 n.2.
114. Id. at 1877 n.4.
115. Id. at 1883-84.
116. Justice Marshall said:
I agree with the Court,. . . that the results in a large number of the Quarles line of cases
can survive today's decision. That the instant seniority system "is rational, in accord
with the industry practice, . . . consistent with NLRB precedents[,] . . . did not have
its genesis in racial discrimination, and. . . was negotiated and has been maintained
free from any illegal purposes," . . . distinguishes the facts of this case from those in
many of the prior decisions.
Id. at 1877 n.3.
117. James v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 46 U.S.L.W. 2164 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1977);
Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., No. 76-2278 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1977); Chrapliwy
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 15 F.E.P. 822 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 9, 1977); Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 15
F.E.P. 680 (5th Cir. July 29, 1977).
118. No. 76-2278 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1977). Judge Butzner, the author of Quarles, sat
on the three judge panel vacating the lower court decision.
119. Id. at 7.
120. 46 U.S.L.W. 2164 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1977).
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conformance with industry standards. Third, the seniority system
must not have had its genesis in racial discrimination, and fourth,
the system must not have been negotiated or maintained for an
illegal purpose.'2 ' Distinguishing Teamsters, Judge Wisdom ob-
served that in James the plaintiff did not concede that the genesis
of the seniority system was free from racial discrimination.' 22 Judge
Wisdom noted the prevalence of segregation in the South at the
time of the adoption of the seniority system'2 and instructed the
lower court in determining the validity of the seniority system to
pay careful attention to the negotiations of the system and employ-
ment practices underlying these negotiations.'12 To determine the
vitality of Quarles and the limitations on Teamsters, the relevance
of the facts upon which these lower federal courts have attempted
to distinguish Teamsters must be determined.
IV. THE RELEVANT SCOPE OF INQUIRY FOR DETERMINING THE LEGALITY
OF A SENIORITY SYSTEM
A. The Effect of Teamsters on the Quarles Method of Inquiry
The meaning of the term "genesis" as applied to seniority sys-
tems has remained ambiguous since the Quarles decision. Inquiry
into the genesis of a seniority system might be limited to an analysis
of the system's establishment isolated from surrounding employ-
ment practices. A seniority system thus would violate title VII only
if it alone demonstrates the employer's intention to discriminate.
Alternatively, inquiry into the genesis of a seniority system might
permit an examination of the total environment in which the system
was established. Under this inquiry, a seniority system established
while other discriminatory practices existed could be found to have
its genesis in discrimination even though no discrimination could be
ascertained by an examination of the system alone. Apparently the
Quarles court engaged in the latter type of inquiry and imputed
discriminatory intent from the defendant's hiring policy to its sen-
iority system, concluding that the system was not bona fide because




124. Id. at 2165.
125. The uncertainty over the inquiry in which the Quarles court engaged arises from
the court's making the broad statement that a seniority system is not bona fide if it has its
genesis in racial discrimination, stating that § 703(h) "touches upon the issue," and then
imputing the discrimination to the seniority system from the hiring practice. 279 F. Supp. at
517-18; see text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
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Teamsters failed to eliminate the ambiguity of the term
"genesis" as applied to seniority systems.' Consequently, the
Teamsters Court left open the question whether discriminatory in-
tent can be imputed to a neutral seniority system from other em-
ployment practices.2 7 If a facially neutral seniority system is
adopted to complement a discriminatory hiring policy, arguably an
intent to discriminate entered into "its very adoption," and the
system itself discriminates. 8 By using the words "themselves" and
"its very," however, the Teamsters Court may have limited the
scope of inquiry into the genesis of a seniority system to the system
isolated from other employment practices. 29 Because the meaning
of the term "genesis" remains ambiguous after Teamsters, lower
federal courts continue to apply the Quarles method of inquiry to
determine the legality of a seniority system. 3 '
B. The Effect of Evans on the Relevant Scope of Inquiry For
Determining the Legality of a Seniority System
Although Justice Stevens attempted to distinguish Evans from
the Quarles line of cases, 3' plaintiff's allegation in Evans'32 that the
seniority system gave present, continuing effect to past discrimina-
tion was indistinguishable from plaintiffs' allegations in Teamsters
and Quarles. 13 3 The narrow holding in Teamsters established that a
seniority sytem that merely perpetuates the effects of pre-title VII
discrimination is lawful.'34 Teamsters relied upon Evans to hold that
a seniority system that merely perpetuates post-Act discrimination
also does not violate title VII. 135 The Court's reliance on Evans in
Teamsters to resolve the issue of the perpetuation of post-Act dis-
crimination and the identical nature of the plaintiff's claims in
Evans and Teamsters severely undermine the ground upon which
126. In Teamsters the issue of genesis was conceded. See text accompanying note 107
supra.
127. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See text accompanying notes 118-24 supra.
131. See text accompanying note 80 supra. The seniority systems in Teamsters and the
Quarles line of cases were not alleged to discriminate because of their deterrent effects.
Everyone within the system experienced the deterrent effect. Blacks, however, suffered more
than whites because of the defendant's past discriminatory practice. Only by reference to the
past act of discrimination could blacks establish a violation of title VII.
132. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 30-33 & 87-91 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
135. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
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Justice Stevens attempted to distinguish Evans from the Quarles-
Teamsters type cases.
The scope of inquiry for determining the legality of a seniority
system alleged to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination
should not differ merely because the discrimination occurred before
rather than after the effective date of title VII. Consequently, the
kind of facts considered relevant in Teamsters for determining the
legality of a seniority system alleged to perpetuate the effects of pre-
Act discrimination should not have differed from the kind of facts
considered relevant in Evans for determining the legality of a senior-
ity system alleged to perpetuate the effects of post-Act discrimina-
tion. Examination of the scope of inquiry in Evans thus reveals
those facts that the Teamsters Court deemed relevant in examining
the legality of the seniority system, thereby clarifying Teamsters'
ambiguous reference to the genesis of a seniority system.'36
In Evans the Court established that a seniority system is illegal
only if it is not "neutral in its operation."' 3 The Court apparently
meant that the seniority system's criteria for allocating employment
opportunities must not be based upon an employee's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Consequently, the most important
facts in determining the legality of a seniority system are those that
disclose the criteria upon which employment opportunities are allo-
cated. The Court in Evans stated that other employment practices
were "relevant background evidence,"'38 but its determination that
the seniority system was neutral in its operation rendered irrelevant
the Seventh Circuit's decision that the employment practice whose
effects were perpetuated by the seniority system violated title VII.' 3'
By focusing on the mechanics of the seniority system, the Evans
Court narrowed the relevant scope of inquiry for determining the
legality of a seniority system to the system isolated from its environ-
ment.
The lower federal courts presently interpreting Teamsters con-
tinue to examine all of the defendant's employment practices in
determining the legality of a seniority system.' 0 By continuing the
Quarles practice of imputing discrimination to a seniority system
from other employment practices, the lower federal court interpre-
tation of Teamsters conflicts with Evans. The ambiguous references
136. See text accompanying notes 126-30 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
138. See note 77 supra.
139. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
140. See text accompanying notes 118-24 supra.
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in Teamsters to the genesis of a seniority system cannot be inter-
preted to allow the imputation of discriminatory intent to a senior-
ity system from other employment practices because Evans places
these other employment practices outside the relevant scope of in-
quiry. Because Evans and Teamsters limit the facts that are rele-
vant for determining the legality of a seniority system, Teamsters
is more difficult to distinguish from the Quarles line of cases, and
as a result, Quarles has less vitality.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 703(h) exempts all seniority systems from the effects of
title VII except those that are not bona fide and those that inten-
tionally discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Because of the difficulty in proving that a seniority
system intentionally discriminates, the most practical means by
which to establish the illegality of a seniority system is to attack its
bona fide character. Quarles interpreted narrowly the term bona
fide by holding that a seniority system that has its genesis in dis-
crimination is not bona fide. According to Quarles, a seniority sys-
tem, although neutral in its intent and operation, had its genesis in
discrimination if adopted in an environment in which discrimina-
tory employment practices existed. Teamsters and Evans combine
to eliminate the Quarles concept of genesis because the two cases
consider employment practices other than the seniority system irrel-
evant in determining a seniority system's legality. In order to estab-
lish the illegality of a seniority system, plaintiffs now must demon-
strate one or more of the following: (1) the mechanics of the system
are such that it allocates employment opportunities on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) the system is irra-
tional; (3) the system is inconsistent with industry practice or
NLRB decisions; (4) intent to discriminate entered into the creation
or maintenance of the system. The intent necessary to establish a
violation of title VII cannot be inferred from the employer's contin-
ued use of a seniority system after its discriminatory effects have
become known"' since the discriminatory effect arising from a sen-
iority system's perpetuation of past discrimination is lawful accord-
ing to Teamsters and Evans. Consequently, plaintiffs face the diffi-
cult task of proving a subjective intent to discriminate in the crea-
tion or maintenance of the seniority system. Teamsters and Evans
therefore expand the meaning of a bona fide seniority system and
141. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
[Vol. 31:151
1978] RECENT DEVELOPMENT 171
limit the lower federal court interpretation of the term
"intentionally" as applied to seniority systems. Because seniority
systems that satisfy the Supreme Court's definition of a bona fide
seniority system and that lack subjective discriminatory intent nev-
ertheless can have discriminatory effects, the Court's decisions re-
duce title VI's effectiveness in eliminating artificial barriers that
limit employment opportunities for minorities and women.
JAMES D. SPRATT, JR.

